Instructor: Glenn Loury, Office Hours: Tuesdays 10-12 pm, and by appointment.

Teaching Assisstant: Debipriya Chatterjee, Office Hours: Mondays, 2:30-4pm.

Class Meets: Mondays and Wednesdays, 9:00-10:20 am, Robinson 301

Section Meets: Tuesdays, 1-2:50 pm, Wilson 204

Syllabus

Readings:

• Koopman's Chap 1 and Chap 3
• Cremer (1982) "A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of Experiments Theorem"
• Yaari (1969) "Some Measures of Risk Aversion and their Uses"
• Nash (1950) "Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games"
• Varian (1980) "A Model of Sales"
• Maskin and Riley (1985) "Auction Theory with Private Values"
• Gibbons (1992) Sections from Chap3 of "A Primer in Game Theory"
• Admati and Perry (1991) "Joint Projects without Commitment"
• Harris and Vickers (1985) "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Race"
• Gibbons (1992) Job-Market Signaling
• Morris (2001) "Political Correctness"
• Akerlof (1970) "Market for "Lemons""

Memos/Notes:

• Production, Co-ordination and Decentralization(Newer version sans some typos. Thanks Hong !)
• Elements of Information Theory.
• Risk Aversion and Risk Dominance (Newer version, after Prof Loury's revision)
• Nash Equilibrium
• Auctions; Second Price Sealed Bid Auction

Homeworks:

• Homework 1
• Homework 2
• Homework 3
• Homework 4
• Homework 5
• Homework 6
• Homework 7
• Homework 8
• Homework 9

Solutions:

• Solution 1
• Solution 2
• Solution 3
• Solution 4
• Solution 5
• Solution 6
• Solution 7 Q1, Q2, Q3
• Solution 8
• Solution 9

Exams:

• Midterm I - March 4, Tuesday, 1:00-2:50 pm, Wilson 204;
• Midterm II- April 8, Tuesday, 1:00-2:50 pm, Wilson 204; Solution
• Final Exam - April 28, Monday, 9-11:00 am, Robinson 301; Solution
• Core Exam - May 15, Thursday,