Instructor: Glenn Loury, Office Hours: Wednesdays, 9-12 pm, and by appointment.

Teaching Assisstant: Debipriya Chatterjee, Office Hours: Mondays, 2:30-3:50pm.

Class Meets: Mondays and Wednesdays, 1:00-2:20 pm, Robinson 301.

Section Meets: Tuesdays, 2:30-3:40 pm, Wilson 204.

Important Announcement from Debipriya (04/15/09): Due to urgent and tragic circumstances, I am having to leave for India rightaway. However, I would be reachable via email, so please feel free to email me if you have any questions.

Syllabus

Readings:

• Koopman's Chap 1 and Chap 3
• Cremer (1982) "A simple proof of Blackwell's Comparison of Experiments Theorem"
• Yaari (1969) "Some measures of Risk Aversion and their uses"
• Varian (1980) " A Model of Sales"
• Aumann (1976) "Agreeing to Disagree"
• Admati and Perry (1991) "Joint Projects without Commitment"
• Harris and Vickers (1985) "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Race"
• Rubinstein (1982) "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model"
• Bulow and Roberts (1989) "The Simple Economics of Auctions"

Notes:

• Production, Co-ordination and Decentralization
• Elements of Information Theory
• Risk Aversion and Risk Dominance
• Nash Equilibrium
• Hotelling Sequential Game with 3 players.
• Auctions

Homeworks:

• Problem Set 1
• Problem Set 2
• Problem Set 3
• Problem Set 4
• Problem Set 5
• Problem Set 6
• Problem Set 7
• Problem Set 8

Solutions:

• Solution 1
• Solution 2
• Solution 3
• Solution 4
• Solution 5 Q1, Q2, Q3.
• Solution 6
• Solution 7
• Solution 8

Exams:

• Midterm 1: March 4, 2009; 1-2:30pm; Robinson 301; Solution.
• Midterm 2: April 15, 2009; 1-2:30pm; Robinson 301; Solution.

Sample Midterms:

• Midterm 1, Spring 2008.
• Midterm 1, Spring 2007.

• Deal-or-No-Deal?
• An Economic Index of Riskiness
• Nash (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games"
• "Professionals Play Minimax"
• Loury(1990) "Tacit Collusion in a Dynamic Duopoly..."
• Cramton, Gibbons, Klemperer (1987) "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently"