Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Oded_Galor/ Title: 2008 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture –Comparative Economic Development: Insights from Unified Growth Theory Abstract: This paper explores the implications of Uni.ed Growth Theory for the origins of existing di¤erences in income per capita across countries. The theory sheds light on three fundamental layers of comparative development. It identi.es the factors that have governed the pace of the transitionfrom stagnation to growth and have thus contributed to contemporary variation in economic development. It uncovers the forces that have sparked the emergence of multiple growth regimes and convergence clubs, and it underlines the persistent e¤ects that variations in pre-historical biogeographical conditions have generated on the composition of human capital and economic development across the globe. Keywords: Growth; Comparative Development; Globalization; Technological Progress; Demographic Transition; Diversity; Human Capital; Malthusian Stagnation Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Omer Ozak Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Oded_Galor/ Author-HOmepage: # Title: Isolation and Development Abstract: This paper exploits cross-country variation in the degree of geographical isolation, prior to the advent of sea-faring and airborne transportation technologies, to examine its impact on the course of economic development across the globe. The empirical investigation establishes that prehistoric geographical isolation has generated a persistent beneficial effect on the process of development and contributed to the contemporary variation in the standard of living across countries. Keywords: Growth, Development; Isolation; Agglomeration; Globalization Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-9 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-9_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-9 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Vernon Henderson Author-Name: Adam Storeygard Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/ Author-Homepage: # Author-HOmepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space Abstract: GDP growth is often measured poorly for countries and rarely measured at all for cities. We propose a readily available proxy: satellite data on lights at night. Our statistical framework uses light growth to supplement existing income growth measures. The framework is applied to countries with the lowest quality income data, resulting in estimates of growth that differ substantially from established estimates. We then consider a longstanding debate: do increases in local agricultural productivity increase city incomes? For African cities, we find that exogenous agricultural productivity shocks (high rainfall years) have substantial effects on local urban economic activity. Keywords: economic growth; remote sensing; urbanization; income measurement Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-8 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-8_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-8 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Stephen Coate Author-Name: Brian Knight Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Brian_Knight/ Title: Pet Overpopulation: An Economic Analysis Abstract: This paper considers the problem of pet overpopulation. It develops a tractable dynamic model whose positive predictions square well with key features of the current U.S. market for pets. The model is used to understand, from a welfare economic perspective, the sense in which there is \overpopulation" of pets and the underlying causes of the problem. The paper also employs the model to consider what policies might be implemented to deal with the problem. A calibrated example is developed to illustrate these corrective policies and quantify the welfare gains they produce. Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-7 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-7_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-7 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Name: Camelia Bejan Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Geoffroy_declippel/ Author-Homepage: # Title: No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems Abstract: We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment. Keywords: Social Choice; Axiomatic Bargaining; Welfarism; Egalitarianism Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-6 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-6_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-6 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Geoffroy_declippel/ Title: Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott Abstract: Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other fields of economic theory. The present paper shows how Nash’s original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives. Similar results can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, and emphasizes that the Nash solution is ordinally invariant on the class of von Neumann-Morgensterm preferences. Keywords: Bargaining; Welfarism; Nash; Kalai-Smorodinsky; Expected Utility Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-5 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-5_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-5 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Name: Kfir Eliaz Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Geoffroy_declippel/ Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Kfir_Eliaz/ Title: Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects Abstract: Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other options in the choice set. This paper argues that both effects may result from an individual’s attempt to overcome the difficulty of making a choice in the absence of a single criterion for ranking the options. Moreover, we propose to view the resolution of this choice problem as a cooperative solution to an intra-personal bargaining problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a different criterion for choosing. We first identify a set of properties that characterize those choice correspondences that coincide with our bargaining solution, for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed-preference foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference relations can be uniquely identified. Alternatively, our analysis may be reinterpreted as a study of (inter-personal) bilateral bargaining over a finite set of options. In that case, our results provide a new characterization, as well as testable implications, of an ordinal bargaining solution that has been previously discussed in the literature under the various names of fallback bargaining, unanimity compromise, Rawlsian arbitration rule and Kant- Rawls social compromise. Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-4 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-4_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-4 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Inequality and Economic Development: An Overview Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the modern perspective on the relationship between inequality and economic development. Keywords: Inequality; Growth; Development Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-3 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-3_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-3 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roland Pongou Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS Abstract: We study the dynamic stability of fidelity networks, which are networks that form in a mating economy of agents of two types (say men and women), where each agent desires direct links with opposite type agents, while engaging in multiple partnerships is considered an act of infidelity. Infidelity is punished more severely for women than for men. We consider two stochastic processes in which agents form and sever links over time based on the reward from doing so, but may also take non-beneficial actions with small probability. In the first process, an agent who invests more time in a relationship makes it stronger and harder to break by his/her partner; in the second, such an agent is perceived as weak. Under the first process, only egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all agents have the same number of partners) are visited in the long run, while under the second, only anti-egalitarian pairwise stable networks (in which all women are matched to a small number of men) are. Next, we apply these results to find that under the first process, HIV/AIDS is equally prevalent among men and women, while under the second, women bear a greater burden. The key message is that anti-female discrimination does not necessarily lead to higher HIV/AIDS prevalence among women in the short run, but it does in the long run. Keywords: Fidelity networks; anti-female discrimination; stochastic stability; HIV/AIDS; union formationmodels Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-2 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-2_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-2 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Francis Bloch Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Geoffroy_declippel/ Title: Cores of Combined Games Abstract: This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. On the other hand, for non-balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non-balanced games which, combined with any other non-balanced game, has an empty core. Keywords: Cooperative Game; Core; Additivity; Issue Linkage; Multi Issue Bargaining Creation-Date: 2009 Number: 2009-1 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2009/2009-1_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-1 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Geoffroy_declippel/ Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin Abstract: We first observe that two of Maskin’s results do not extend beyond three players: we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique efficient solution for each ordering of the players, but for which the payoff vector obtained by averaging these solutions over the different orderings does not coincide with the Shapley value. On the other hand, we reinforce Maskin’s insight that externalities may play a crucial role in generating inefficiency. Many existing solutions on how to share profits assume or derive the property of efficiency. Yet we argue that players may have an interest to choose with whom to bargain. We illustrate how this may trigger inefficiency, especially in the presence of externalities, even if bargaining among any group of agents results in an efficient distribution of the surplus they can produce. We also provide some sufficient conditions for efficiency. Keywords: externalities; coalition formation; Shapley value Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-16 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-16_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Name: David Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long Run Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequity Abstract: We construct a matrix showing the share of the year 2000 population in every country that is descended from people in different source countries in the year 1500. Using this matrix, we analyze how post-1500 migration has influenced the level of GDP per capita and within-country income inequality in the world today. Indicators of early development such as early state history and the timing of transition to agriculture have much better predictive power for current GDP when one looks at the ancestors of the people who currently live in a country than when one considers the history on that country’s territory, without adjusting for migration. Measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of a country’s current population do not predict income inequality as well as measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of the current population’s ancestors. An even better predictor of current inequality in a country is the variance of early development history of the country’s inhabitants, with ethnic groups originating in regions having longer histories of agriculture and organized states tending to be at the upper end of a country’s income distribution. However, high within-country variance of early development also predicts higher income per capita, holding constant the average level of early development. Keywords: Economic Growth; Migration; Income Inequality; State History; Linquistic Distance Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-15 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-15_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Dynamics and Stagnation in the Malthusain Epoch: Theory and Evidence Abstract: This paper empirically tests the predictions of the Malthusian theory with respect to both population dynamics and income per capita stagnation in the pre-Industrial Revolution era. The theory suggests that improvements in technology during this period generated only temporary gains in income per capita, eventually leading to a larger but not richer population. Using exogenous cross-country variations in land productivity and the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, the analysis demonstrates that, in accordance with the Malthusian theory, societies that were characterized by higher land productivity and an earlier onset of agriculture had higher population densities, but similar standards of living, during the time period 1-1500 CE. Keywords: Growth; Technological Progress; Population Dynamics; Land Productivity; Neolithic Revolution; Malthusian Stagnation Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-14 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-14_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Marilda Sotomayor Author-Homepage: # Title: Adjusting Prices in the Many-to-many Assignment Game Abstract: Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key definition in the description of the algorithm. Such approach was previously used by several authors. We introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with a quota greater than one consuming at most one unit of each seller’s good. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the overdemanded sets than the constructions existing in the literature, even in the simplest case of additive utilities considered here. As the previous papers, our mechanism yields the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector. A procedure to find the maximum competitive equilibrium price vector is also provided. Keywords: matching; stable payoff; competitive equilibrium payoff; optimal stable payoff; lattice social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Marilda Sotomayor Author-Homepage: # Title: The Pareto-Stability Concept is a Natural Solution Concept for Discrete Matching Markets with Iindifferences Abstract: In a decentralized setting the game-theoretical predictions are that only strong blockings are allowed to rupture the structure of a matching. This paper argues that, under indifferences, also weak blockings should be considered when these blockings come from the grand coalition. This solution concept requires stability plus Pareto optimality. A characterization of the set of Pareto-stable matchings for the roommate and the marriage models is provided in terms of individually rational matchings whose blocking pairs, if any, are formed with unmatched agents. These matchings always exist and give an economic intuition on how blocking can be done by non-trading agents, so that the transactions need not be undone as agents reach the set of stable matchings. Some properties of the Pareto-stable matchings shared by the Marriage and Roommate models are obtained. Keywords: Pareto-optimal; stable matching; Pareto-stable matching; simple matching; Pareto-simple matching Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Marilda Sotomayor Author-Homepage: # Title: Adjusting Prices in the Many-to-many Assignment Game Abstract: Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key definition in the description of the algorithm. Such approach was previously used by several authors. We introduce a novel distinction by considering multiple sellers owing multiple identical objects and multiple buyers with a quota greater than one consuming at most one unit of each seller’s good. This distinction induces a necessarily more complicated construction of the overdemanded sets than the constructions existing in the literature, even in the simplest case of additive utilities considered here. As the previous papers, our mechanism yields the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector. A procedure to find the maximum competitive equilibrium price vector is also provided. Keywords: matching; stable payoff; competitive equilibrium payoff; optimal stable payoff; lattice social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M Feldman Author-Name: Ram Singh Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm Author-Homepage: http:www.econdse.org/faculty-frame.htm Title: Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide Abstract: In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties’ degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table. Keywords: Comparative vigilance; equity; economic efficiency; tort liability rules; Nash equilibrium; social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mario Tirelli Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: //www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio_Turner Title: A social welfare function characterizing competitive equilibria of incomplete financial markets Abstract: A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies with missing ? nancial markets. We give such a characterization for economies with missing ?nancial markets, by an amended social welfare function. Its parameters capture both the relative importance of households?welfare?the classic weights?as well as the disagreements among them as to the value of the missing markets. As a by-product, we identify the dimension of the set of interior equilibrium allocations. Keywords: incomplete markets; social welfare function; manifold Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M Feldman Author-Name: Ram Singh Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm Author-Homepage: # Title: Comparative Vigilance Abstract: A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparative vigilance. We devise liability rules that are efficient and that reward vigilance exhibited by the parties. It is commonly believed that discontinuous liability shares are necessary for efficiency, but we develop a liability rule that is both efficient and continuous, based on comparative negligence when both parties are negligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties are vigilant. Moreover, our rule divides accident losses into two parts: one part creates incentives for efficiency; the other part provides equity. Keywords: Comparative vigilance; equity; economic efficiency; tort liability rules; Nash equilibrium; social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-9 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-9_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-9 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M Feldman Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World Abstract: In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version assumes two or more people. Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to illustrate our points. Keywords: Arrow's Theorem; single-profile Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-8 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-8_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-8 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Name: Ashley Lester Author-Name: David Weil Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Ashley_Lester Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil Title: When Does Improving Health Raise GDP? Abstract: We assess quantitatively the effect of exogenous health improvements on output per capita. Our simulation model allows for a direct effect of health on worker productivity, as well as indirect effects that run through schooling, the size and age-structure of the population, capital accumulation, and crowding of fixed natural resources. The model is parameterized using a combination of microeconomic estimates, data on demographics, disease burdens, and natural resource income in developing countries, and standard components of quantitative macroeconomic theory. We consider both changes in general health, proxied by improvements in life expectancy, and changes in the prevalence of two particular diseases: malaria and tuberculosis. We find that the effects of health improvements on income per capita are substantially lower than those that are often quoted by policy-makers, and may not emerge at all for three decades or more after the initial improvement in health. The results suggest that proponents of efforts to improve health in developing countries should rely on humanitarian rather than economic arguments. Keywords: Health; Human Capital; Life Expectancy; Disease Eradication; Fertility; Population Size; Age Structure; Captital Accumulation; Natural Resources; Income Per Capita Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-7 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-7_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-7 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Malthusian Population Dynamics: Theory and Evidence Abstract: This paper empirically tests the existence of Malthusian population dynamics in the pre-Industrial Revolution era. The theory suggests that, during the agricultural stage of development, resource surpluses beyond the maintenance of subsistence consumption were channeled primarily into population growth. In particular, societies naturally blessed by higher land productivity would have supported larger populations, given the level of socioeconomic development. Moreover, given land productivity, societies in more advanced stages of development, as reflected by their cumulative experience with the agricultural technological paradigm since the Neolithic Revolution, would have sustained higher population densities. Using exogenous cross-country variations in the natural productivity of land and in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, the analysis demonstrates that, in accordance with the Malthusian theory, societies that were characterized by higher land productivity and an earlier onset of agriculture had a higher population density in the time period 1-1500 CE. Keywords: Growth; Technological Progress; Population Dynamics; Land Productivity; Neolithic Revolution; Malthusian Stagnation Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-6 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-6_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-6 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Yusuke Kamishiro Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies Abstract: We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the basic economy: independent copies of the economy in which each individual’s utility only depends on the information of the individuals who belong to the same copy. We provide an example in which core convergence does not obtain for the Dutta-Vohra credible core and for Myerson’s randomized mediated core. On the other hand, we establish a positive convergence result for a refinement of Myerson’s core for which information disseminates across coalitions within a given random blocking mechanism. Under some conditions, this core converges to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations. Keywords: Core Convergence; Information Transmission; Coalitional Voting; Mechanisms; Mediation; Rational Expectations Equilibrium Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-5 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-5_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-5 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Brian Snowdon Author-Homepage: # Title: Towards a Unified Theory of Economic Growth: Oded Galor on the Transition from Malthusian Stagnation to Modern Economic Growth Abstract: An interview with Oded Galor on the development of unified growth theory. Keywords: Unified Growth Theory; Population; Technology; Demographic Transition; Sustained Growth Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-4 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-4_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-4 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Human Genetic Diversity and Comparative Economic Development Abstract: This research contributes to the understanding of human genetic diversity within a society as a significant determinant of its economic development. The hypothesis advanced and empirically examined in this paper suggests that there are socioeconomic trade-offs associated with genetic diversity within a given society. The investigation exploits an exogenous source of cross-country variation in genetic diversity by appealing to the “out of Africa” hypothesis of human origins to empirically establish a non-monotonic effect of genetic diversity on development outcomes in the pre-colonial era. Contrary to theories that reject a possible role for human genetics in influencing economic development, this study demonstrates the economic significance of diversity in genetic traits, while abstaining entirely from conceptual frameworks that posit a hierarchy of such traits in terms of their conduciveness to the process of economic development. Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-3 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-3_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-3 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Andrew Mountford Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence Abstract: This research argues that the di¤erential e¤ect of international trade on the demand for human capital across countries has been a major determinant of the distribution of income and population across the globe. In developed countries the gains from trade have been directed towards investment in education and growth in income per capita, whereas a signi?cant portion of these gains in less developed economies have been channeled towards population growth. Cross-country regressions establish that indeed trade has positive e¤ects on fertility and negative e¤ects on education in non-OECD economies, while inducing fertility decline and human capital formation in OECD economies. Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-2 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-2_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-2 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Name: Bruno Garcia Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Homepage: # Title: Getting Punnishment Right: Do Costly Monitoring or Redustributive Punishment Help? Abstract: We introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities to punish, to see how contributions and punishments change when (a) each dollar lost in punishment must be awarded to another team member and/or when (b) obtaining information on individuals’ contributions is a costly choice. Conjectures that tying punishments to rewards might reduce punishment of high contributors (perverse punishment) or increase overall punishing are not completely born out, but innovation (a) nonetheless succeeds in making the net punishment of high contributors much less common because they receive enough rewards to offset punishment. A surprise finding is that innovation (b) also decreases the incidence of misdirected punishment, since high contributors do more monitoring than low ones while low contributors do most of the perverse punishing. Both innovations raise both contributions and earnings relative to the familiar VCM-with-punishment treatment. Creation-Date: 2008 Number: 2008-1 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-1_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-1 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Homepage: //www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Tony_Lancaster Title: Ecplaining Bootstraps and Robustness Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-17 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-17_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mario Tirelli Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: //www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio_Turner Title: Quantifying Inefficiency in Incomplete Asset Markets Abstract: It is known that the incompleteness of asset markets causes inefficiency in almost every equilibrium. Yet unexplored is the "size" of this inefficiency. The size of a Pareto improvement is the total willingness to pay for it, out of current consumption. Inefficiency is the maximum size of any Pareto improving reallocation. Inefficiency of US consumption in middle age is computed to be 10-11% of total consumption in youth, for CRRA parameters 1.5-3.25, in calibrated economy. The inefficiency of a general economy is approximated. A natural approximation, based on marginal rates of substitution (MRS), is preposterously crude in the calibrated economy, owing to a law of diminishing willingness to pay. Alternative approximations end up being functions of a classical notion, weighted social welfare maximized subject to resource constraints. They are simple, sharper in general and accurate in the calibrated economy. Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-16 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-16_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Avner Ben-Ner Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Name: Ting Ren Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Homepage: # Title: Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Non-binding Communication in a Trust Experiment Abstract: We let subjects interact with anonymous partners in trust (investment) games with and without one of two kinds of pre-play communication: numerical (tabular) only, and verbal and numerical. We find that either kind of pre-play communication increases trusting, trustworthiness, or both, in inter-subject comparisons, but that the inclusions of verbal communication generates both a larger effect and one that is robust across both inter-subject and intra-subject comparisons. In all conditions, trustors earn more when they invest more of their endowment, trustors and trustees gravitate to "fair and efficient" interactions, and the majority of trustees adhere to their commitments, whether explicit or implicit. Finally, we study trusting and trustworthiness in the sense of adhering to agreements, and we find that both are enhanced when the parties can use words, and especially when an agreement is reached with words and not only with the exchange of numerical proposals. Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-15 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-15_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Omer Moav Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: The Neolithic Revolution and Contemporary Variations in Life Expectancy Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-14 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-14_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ruben Durante Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Preferences For Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study Abstract: Why is there significant political support for progressive taxation and equalizing government transfers in western democracies? Possibilities include individual socail preferences for a less unequal distribution than what market forces alone would dictate, demand for social insurance, or successful political coalitions to redistribute away from the rich. We study the relative importance of fairness preferences, risk aversion, and self-interest in determining support for redistribution through a set of experiments in which a large number of subjects are asked to choose what level of taxation to implement under different decision conditions and with four alternative determinants of pre-tax income (two task-based, one random, and one based on socio-economic background). Treatments using varying costs of redistribution to the decision-maker and efficiency losses to recipients are used to study willingness to pay for redistribution and concern for aggregate inefficiency. Most of our subjects prefer that there be less inequality among others and demand for redistribution responds in predictable ways to the cost of taxation and to the dead-weigh loss associated with it. The external validity of the experiment is supported by the high correlation between tax decisions and political preferences. We also find evidence that preferred levels of redistribution are highly responsive to whether pre-tax incomes are determined according to task performance, a trend that is much more evident among men than among woman. Comparisons between redistributive choices under different experimental conditinos provide interesting insights with regard to the relative importance of inequality aversion and self-interest when choosing under uncertainty and when uncertainty is resolved. In the first case, individuals expectation about their future position in the income distribution has a considerable impact on their tax choices. When sure of the effect on their own earnings, subjects tax choices are primarily goverened by self-interest, but fairness preferences continue to play a role. Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M Feldman Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Name: Antonio Cabrales Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Homepage: # Title: Implementation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bo Author-Name: Andrew Foster Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Pedro_Dal_Bo Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Homepage: http://adfdell.pstc.brown.edu/index.html Title: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy Abstract: We present results from a novel experiment on the effect of a policy designed to encourage cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. We find that the effect of this policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it was chosen democratically by the subjects than when it was exogenously imposed. This difference remains after controlling for selection (those that choose the plicy may be more likely to be affected by it). We conclude that the treatment effect of policies may depend on whether they are endogenous or exogenous to the society on which they are imposed. Therefore, democratic institutions may have an effect on behavior in addition to the effect in terms of policy choice. More generally, our findings have implications for empirical studies of treatment effects in other contexts: the effect of a treatment may depend on whether it is endogenous or exogenous. Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-9 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-9_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-9 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Multiple Growth Regimes-Insights from Unified Growth Theory Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-8 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-8_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-8 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bo Author-Name: Guillaume R. Frechette Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Pedro_Dal_Bo Author-Homepage: # Title: The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence Number: 2007-7 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-7_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-7 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Georgy Artemov Author-Name: Takashi Kunimoto Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-6 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-6_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-6 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Nathaniel Baum-Snow Author-Name: Justin Marion Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Nathaniel_Baum-Snow Author-Homepage: # Title: The Effects of Low Income Housing Developments on Neighborhoods Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-5 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-5_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-5 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Stefan Grosse Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Name: Bettina Rockenbach Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Homepage: # Title: Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-4 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-4_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-4 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Quamrul Ashraf Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Cultural Assimilation, Cultural Diffusion and the Origin of the Wealth of Nations Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-3 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-3_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-3 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: James M. Malcomson Author-Name: Sophocles Mavroeidis Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Sophocles_Mavroeidis/ Title: Matching Frictions, Efficiency Wages, and Unemployment in the USA and the UK Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-02 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-2_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Rene Saran Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/students/Rene_Saran/ Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: The Evolution of Bidding Behavior in Private-Values Auction and Double Auctions Creation-Date: 2007 Number: 2007-01 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2007/2007-1_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2007-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lily Qiu Author-Name: Hong Wan Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Lily_Qiu Author-Homepage: # Title: Selection or Influence? Institutional Investors and Acquisition Targets Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-25 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-25_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-25 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: The Demographic Transition Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-24 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-24_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-24 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Avner Ben-Ner Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Trust, Communication and Contracts: Experimental Evidence Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-23 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-23_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-23 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Human Capital, Fertility and Growth Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-22 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-22_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-22 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Matthias Cinyabuguma Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Sub-Saharan Growth Surprises: Geography, Institutions And History in an all African Data Panel Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-21 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-21_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-21 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Robert J. Aumann Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: An Economic Index of Riskiness Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-20 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-20_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Agriculture, Diffusion,and Development: Ripple Effects of the Neolithic Revolutions Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-19 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-19_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Labor-Managed Firms Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-18 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-18_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lily Qiu Author-Name: Gerard Hoberg Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Lily_Qiu Author-Homepage: # Title: Growth to Value: A Difficult Journey for IPOs and Concentrated Industries Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2005-17 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-17_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: Economic Growth in the Very Long-Run Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-16 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-16_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ernesto Dal Bo Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bo Author-Name: Jason Snyder Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Pedro_Dal_Bo Author-Homepage: # Title: Political Dynasties Number: 2006-15 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-15_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Omer Moav Author-Name: Dietrich Vollrath Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: # Title: Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions, and Great Divergence Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-14 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-14_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sophocles Mavroeidis Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Sophocles_Mavroeidis/ Title: Testing the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Without Assuming Identification Abstract: We re-examine the evidence on the new Phillips curve model of Gali and Gertler (Journal of Monetary Economics 1999) using the conditional score test of Kleibergen (Econometrica 2005), which is robust to weak identification. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that US postwar data are consistent both with the view that inflation dynamics are forward-looking, and with the opposite view that they are predominantly backward-looking. Moreover, the labor share does not appear to be a relevant determinant of inflation. We show that this is an important factor contributing to the weak identification of the Phillips curve. Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Stelios Michalopoulos Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Darwinian Evolution of Entrepreneurial Spirit and the Process of Development Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M. Feldman Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Darwinian Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio Turner Title: Pareto Improving Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: David Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: Population Aging Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-09 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-09_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: David Weil Author-Name: Heinrich Hock Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Author-Homepage: # Title: The Dynamics of the Age Structure, Dependency, and Consumption Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-08 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-08_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio Turner Title: Theory of Demand in Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-07 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-07_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tl/ Title: A Note on Brootstraps and Robustness Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-06 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-06_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Name: Sung Jae Jun Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tl/ Author-Homepage: # Title: Baysian Quantile Regression Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-05 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-05_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Name: Norovsambuu Tumennasan Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio_Turner Author-Homepage: # Title: Pareto Improving Monetary Policy in Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-04 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-04_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio Turner Title: Pareto Improving Taxation in Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-03 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-03_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sergio Turner Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Sergio Turner Title: How much trade does the transfer paradox require? The threshold computed Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-02 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-02_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded_Galor Author-Name: Andrew Mountford Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Trade and the Great Divergence: The Family Connection Creation-Date: 2006 Number: 2006-01 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2006/2006-01_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Arhan Ertan Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Toby_Page Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment? Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mario Tirelli Author-Homepage: # Title: Constrained Inefficiency In GEI: A Geometric Argument Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Anirban Kar Author-Name: Indrajit Ray Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Olivier Bochet Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Toby_Page Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-09 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-09_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lily Qiu Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Lily_Qiu Title: Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-08 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-08_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: Accounting for the Effect of Health on Economic Growth Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-07 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2005/2005-07_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lily Qiu Author-Name: Gerard Hoberg Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Lily_Qiu Author-Homepage: # Title: Future Industrial Organization and Stock Returns versus the Decision to Issue IPOs Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-06 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-06_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Iliev Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Social Capability, History and the Economies of Communist and Post-Communist States Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-05 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-05_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-05 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Name: Omer Moav Author-Name: Dietrich Vollrath Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: # Title: Land Inequality and the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-03 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-03_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: # Title: An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-02 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-02_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games Creation-Date: 2005 Number: 2005-01 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2005/2005-01_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Lili Qiu Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Lili_Qiu Title: Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-21 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-21_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-21 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-20 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-20_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: # Title: Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-19 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-19_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: # Title: The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-18 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-18_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Geoffroy de Clippel Author-Homepage: # Title: An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-17 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-17_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded_Galor Author-Name: Andrew Mountford Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Trading Population for Productivity Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-16 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-16_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: From Stagnation to Growth:Unified Growth Theory Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-15 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-15_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded_Galor Author-Name: Omer Moav Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: # Title: Natural Selection and the Evolution of Life Expectancy Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-14 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-14_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded_Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Oded_Galor Title: The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Matthias Cinyabuguma Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Toby_Page Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pedro DalBo Author-Name: Ernesto DalBo Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Pedro_Dal_Bo Author-Homepage: # Title: Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: John H. Tyler Author-Name: Jeffrey R. Kling Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: # Title: PRISON-BASED EDUCATION AND RE-ENTRY INTO THE MAINSTREAM LABOR MARKET Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-10 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Author-Name: William Maloney Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~pk/ Author-Homepage: # Title: Trade Policy, Income Risk, and Welfare Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-09 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-09_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Title: Welfare Cost of Business Cycles When Markets Are Incomplete Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-08 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-08_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Herschel_Grossman Title: Peace and War in Territorial Disputes Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-07 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-07_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Michihiro Kandori Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Author-Homepage: # Title: Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-06 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-06_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Matthias Cinyabuguma Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Toby_Page Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Cooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-05 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/working/pdfs/expul_pap_workingp.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Areendam Chanda Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Early Starts, Reversals and Catchup in The Process of Economic Development Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-04 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/working/pdfs/earlystartsreversalscatchup_1.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-03 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-03_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: The Measurement of Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-02 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-02_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Umut Ones Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: # Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2004-01 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2004/2004-01_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tomoyuki Nakajima Author-Homepage: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~nakajima Title: Asset Price Fluctuations in Japan: 1980-2000 Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-25 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-25_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-25 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tomoyuki Nakajima Author-Homepage: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~nakajima Title: Unemployment and Indeterminacy Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-24 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-24_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-24 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-23 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-23_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-23 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Harumi Ito Author-Name: Darin Lee Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/details.php?ID=19 Title: Incumbent Responses to Lower Cost Entry: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-22 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/incumbent_final.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-22 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Name: Bhaskar Dutta Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-21 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp03-21.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-21 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Anna Aizer Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/details.php?ID=5 Title: Got Health? Advertising, Medicaid and Child Health Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-20 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/gothealthwp.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-19 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-19_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sean Campbell Author-Name: Canlin Li Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Sean_Campbell Title: Per Capita Consumption, Luxury Consumption and the Presidential Puzzle: A Partial Resolution Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-18 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-18_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M. Feldman Author-Name: Jeonghyun Kim Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman Title: Victim or Injurer:Negligence-Based Liability Rules Under Role-Type Uncertainty, With An Extension to Collisions Of Different-Sized Vehicles Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-17 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-17_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Harumi Ito Author-Name: Darin Lee Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/details.php?ID=19 Title: Assessing the Impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Airline Demand Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-16 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-16_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Name: Christopher M. Anderson Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman Title: Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-15 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-15_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: Distributional Disputes and Civil Conflict Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-14 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-14_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: ...and six hundred thousand men were dead Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-13 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-13_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Harumi Ito Author-Name: Darin Lee Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/details.php?ID=19 Title: Low Cost Carrier Growth in the U.S. Airline Industry: Past, Present, and Future Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-12 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-12_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Qinghua Zhang Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/details.php?ID=54 Title: Distortionary, Non-Distortionary, and Distributional Properties of Environmental Taxes: Extension of Sandmo's Observation Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-11 File-URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2003/2003-11_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: Fifty-four Forty or Fight Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-10 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-10_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen Title: Asymptotic Tests of Composite Hypotheses Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-09 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-9_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Gauri Kartini Shastry Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: How Much of Cross-Country Income Variation is Explained by Health? Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-08 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-8_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Kyung-Mook Lim Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/index.html Title: The Baby Boom and the Stock Market Boom Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-07 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-7_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Wolfgang Keller Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Wolfgang_Keller Author-Name: Stephen R. Yeaple Title: Multinational Enterprises, International Trade, and Productivity Growth: Firm-Level Evidence from the United States Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-06 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-6_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen Author-Name: Asger Lunde Author-Name: James M. Nason Title: Choosing the Best Volatility Models:The Model Confidence Set Approach Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-05 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-5_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor Author-Name: Omer Moav Author-Name: Dietrich Vollrath Title: Land Inequality and the Origin of Divergence and Overtaking in the Growth Process: Theory and Evidence Creation-Date: 2004 Number: 2003-04 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-3_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen Author-Name: Asger Lunde Title: Testing the Significance of Calendar Effects Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-03 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-3_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Indra Ray Author-Name: Susan Snyder Title: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-02 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-2_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen Author-Name: Asger Lunde Title: Consistent Preordering with an Estimated Criterion Function, with an Application to the Evaluation and Comparison of Volatility Models Creation-Date: 2003 Number: 2003-01 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2003/2003-1_paper.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Title: Growth & Welfare Effects of Business Cycles In Economies with Idiosyncratic Human Capital Risk Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-31 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-31.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-31 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Title: Recursive Equilibrium in Endigenous Growth Models with Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-30 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-30.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-30 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oliver Bochet Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/index.html Title: Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-29 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-29.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-29 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ernesto Dal Bó Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bó Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Pedro_Dal_Bo Author-Name: Rafael Di Tella Title: 'Plata o Plomo': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-28 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-28.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-28 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Allan M. Feldman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman Author-Name: Jeonghyun Kim Title: The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-27 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/Feldman&Kim.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-27 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sean D. Campbell Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Sean_Campbell Title: Specification Testing and Semiparametric Estimation of Regime Switching Models: An Examination of the US Short Term Interest Rate Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-26 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-26.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-26 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tomoyuki Nakajima Author-Homepage: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~nakajima/index.html Author-Name: Herakles Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~hpolemar/index.html Title: Monetary Equilibria with Monopolistic Competition and Sticky Prices Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-25 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-25.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-25 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Indrajit Ray Title: Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-24 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-24.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-24 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~iph Title: Learning to Open Monty Hall's Doors Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-23 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-23.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-23 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Eugenio Miravete Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~iph Title: Learning Temporal Preferences Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-22 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-22.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-22 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bó Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Pedro_Dal_Bo Title: Tacit Collusion Under Intrest Rate Fluctuations Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-21 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-21.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-21 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pedro Dal Bó Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Pedro_Dal_Bo Title: Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-20 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-20.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/index.html Author-Name: Bulent Unel Title: Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-19 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-19.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Title: Asset Returns in an Endogenous Growth Model with Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-18 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-18.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~tkrebs Title: Non-Existence of Recursive Equilibria on Compact State Spaces When Markets are Incomplete Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-17 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-17.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: H. Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~hpolemar/index.html Author-Name: S. Demichelis Title: Frequency of Trade and the Determinancy of Equilibrium Paths: Logarithmic Economies of Overlapping Generations Under Certainty Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-16 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-16.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: Annexation or Conquest? The Economics of Empire Building Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-15 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-15.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Takashi Kunimoto Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: Bargaining and Competition Revisited Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-14 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-14.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~iph Author-Name: Oscar Volij Title: The Measure of Intellectual Influence Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-13 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-13.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: G. Bloise Author-Name: J.H. Dreze Author-Name: H.M. Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~hpolemar/index.html Title: Money and Indeterminacy Over an Infinite Horizon Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-12 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-12.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-11 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-11.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: P.A. Chiappori Author-Name: I. Ekeland Author-Name: F. Kubler Author-Name: H.M. Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~hpolemar/index.html Title: Testable Implications of General Equilibrium Theory: a differentiable approach Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-10 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-10.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: John H. Tyler Author-Homepage: http://www.brown.edu/education/Tyler Title: Basic Skills and the Earnings of Dropouts Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-09 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-09.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen Title: On the Estimation of Reduced Rank Regressions Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-08 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-08.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Yoshiaki Azuma Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: A Theory of the Informal Sector Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-07 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002_07.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Robert Sauer Title: Educational Financing and Lifetime Earnings Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-06 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-06.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Martin Kolmar Title: Endogenously Excludable Goods Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-05 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/privpub.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Martin Kolmar Title: Endogenously Excludable Goods Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-04 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/mutcon.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Martin Kolmar Title: Federalism and the optimal Degree of Centralization of Public Goods Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-03 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/fiscfed.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Hansen Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen/ Title: Generalized Reduced Rank Regression Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-02 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen/Papers/grrr.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Herschel_Grossman Title: Constitution or Conflict? Creation-Date: 2002 Number: 2002-01 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/2002/wp2002-01.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: P.J.J. Herings Author-Name: Herakles Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~hpolemar Title: Equilibrium and arbitrage in incomplete asset markets with fixed prices Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-28 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp01/ifa.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-28 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Enrico Minelli Author-Name: Herakles Polemarchakis Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~hpolemar Title: Information at Equilibrium Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-27 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp01/ieq.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-27 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Phillip Garner Author-Name: Enrico Spolare Title: Why Chads? 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Santos Title: A Theory of Markets, Institutions and Endogenous Preferences Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-18 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: Professionals Play Minimax Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-17 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Luis Garicano Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Name: Canice Prendergast Title: Favoritism Under Social Pressure Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-16 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Name: Ana I. Saracho Title: An Empirical Analysis of Agency Theory, Durable Goods and CEO Incentive Contracts Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-15 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Luis Garicano Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: An Empirical Examination of Multidimensional Effort in Tournaments Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-14 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: The Human Capital of Stockholders and the International Diversification Puzzle Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-13 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: The Human Capital of Stockholders and the International Diversification Puzzle Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-12 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: What Determines the Size of the Human Capital Premium? Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-11 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Title: An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Properties of Human Capital Returns Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-10 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Toby page Title: TBA Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-09 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Author-Name: Giovanna Paladino Title: Country Default Risk: An Empirical Assessment Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-08 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Title: Idiosyncratic Risk, Aggregate Saving, and Economic Growth Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-07 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Reinhard Hansen Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~phansen Title: An Unbiased and Powerful Test for Superior Predictive Ability Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-06 File-URL: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~phansen/Papers/spa.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Author-Name: Oscar Volig Title: Rejecting Small Gambles under Expected Utility: a Comment on Rabin Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-05 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/pdfs//wp01-05.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Asger Lunde Author-Name: Peter Reinhard Hansen Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~phansen Title: A Forecast Comparison of Volatility Models: Does Anything Beat a GARCH(1,1)? Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-04 File-URL: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~phansen/Papers/vola.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Yoshiaki Azuma Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman Title: Educational Inequality Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-03 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/ineq.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Bhaskar Dutta Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-02 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp2001-02.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Francoise Forges Author-Name: Jean-Francois Mertens Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects Creation-Date: 2001 Number: 2001-01 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp2001-01.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2001-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Francoise Forges Author-Name: Enrico Minelli Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-22 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp2000-22.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-22 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Reinhard Hansen Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~phansen Title: Structural Changes in the Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Model Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-20 File-URL: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~phansen/Papers/change.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Peter Reinhard Hansen Author-Homepage: http://chico.stc.brown.edu/~phansen Title: The Johansen-Granger Representation Theorem: A Closed Form Expression for I(1)Processes Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-19 File-URL: http://chico.pstc.brown.edu/~phansen/Papers/jgrt.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor / Author-Name: Omer Moav Title: Natural Selection and the Origin of economic Growth Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-18 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/working/pdfs/gm .pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor / Author-Name: Omer Moav Title: Das Human Kapital Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-17 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/working/pdfs/dhk.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-16 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp00-16.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman Title: The Creation of Effective Property Rights Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-15 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman Title: Inventors and Pirates:Creative Activity and Intellectual Property Rights Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-14 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/Serrano Title: Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-13 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Author-Name: Valerie Bockstette Title: States and Markets:the Advantage of an Early Start Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-12 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Yong_Seok Choi Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Title: The Factor Content of Bilateral Trade:an Empirical Test Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-11 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Tom Krebs Title: Consumption-Based Asset Pricing with Incomplete Markets Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-10 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Xiaoyuan Dong Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman Title: Investigating the Rise of Labor Redundancy in China's State Industry Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-09 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-09 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Younghwan In Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Title: Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-08 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-08 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman Author-Name: Minseong Kim Title: Is a Moral Disposition Rewarded? Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-07 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-07 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name:Assaf Ben-Shoham Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Author-Name: Oscar Volig Title: The Evolution of Change Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-06 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-06 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~skalemli Title: Decisiveness and the Viability of the State Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-05 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-05 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Talbot Page Author-Name: Qinghua Zhang Title: Non-Distortionary Environmental Taxes Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-04 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-04 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra Title: Decisiveness and the Viability of the State Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-03 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp2000-3.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-03 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: Minseong Kim Author-Name: Juan Mendoza Title: Decisiveness and the Viability of the State Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-02 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/anarchy.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-02 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Hugo Benitez-Silva Author-Name: Moshe Buchinsky Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~buchins Author-Name: Hiu Man Chan Author-Name: Sofia Cheidvasser Author-Name: John Rust Title: How Large is the Bias in Self-Reported Disability? Creation-Date: 2000 Number: 2000-01 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-01 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Yukako Ono Title: Outsourcing Services, City Size, and Productivity of City Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-34 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-34 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Adam Idzik Author-Name: Gyula O.H. Katona Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra Title: Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending? Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-33 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/papers/wp99-33.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-33 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mark Pitt Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu:80/~mp/ Title: Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending? Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-32 File-URL: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu:80/~mp/bids2.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-32 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Dimitriy Gershenson Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Title: Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending? Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-31 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/civil.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-31 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Gianpaolo Rossini Author-Name: Luca Lambertini Title: Endogenous Choice of Capacity and Product Innovation in a Differentiated Duopoly Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-30 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-30 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Gianpaolo Rossini Author-Name: Michele Moretto Title: The Efficient Assignment of the Exit Option Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-29 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-29 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Avner Ben-Ner Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/index.html Title: Reciprocity in a Two Part Dictator Game Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-28 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/working/pdfs/chig_aer.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-28 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/index.html Author-Name: Omer Moav Title: From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality in the Process of Development Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-27 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/working/pdfs/gmii-sep20.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-27 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~ov Title: In Defense or Defect or Cooperation Does not Justify the Solution Concept Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-26 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-26 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Dimitriy Gershenson Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Title: Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-25 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/cooption.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-25 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: Juan Mendoza Title: Scarcity and Conflict Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-24 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/scarcity.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-24 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Wendell H. Fleming Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Title: A Stochastic Optimal Control Approach to International Finance and Foreign Debt Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-23 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-23 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://volij.co.il Title: On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-22 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp99/pdfs/99-22.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-22 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Richard D. McKelvey Author-Name: Talbot Page Title: Taken the Coase Theorem Seriously Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-21 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-21 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tom Krebs Title: Information and Efficiency in Financial Market Equilibrium Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-20 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-20 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: Juan Mendoza Title: The Struggle for Survival Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-19 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/struggle.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-19 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: Bargaining and Bargaining Sets Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-18 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp99/pdfs/99-18.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-18 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Donald W.K. Andrews Author-Name: Moshe Buchinsky Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~buchins/ Title: On the Number of Bootstrap Repetitions for Bca Confidence Intervals Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-17 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-17 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan Author-Name: Bent E. Sørensen Author-Name: Oved Yosha Title: Risk Sharing and Industrial Specialization: Regional and International Evidence Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-16 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-16 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/~tl/ Author-Name: S. Siyar Title: Econometric Analysis of Dynamic Models: A Growth Theory Example Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-15 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-15 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: Juan Mendoza Title: Butter and Guns: Complementarity between Economic and Military Competition Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-14 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/guns.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-14 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Daniel L. Millimet Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~millimet/ Title: The Impact of Children on Wages, Job Tenure, and the Division of Household Labor Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-13 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-13 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Subir Chattopadhyay Author-Name: Piero Gottardi Title: Stochastic OLG Models, Market Structure, and Optimality Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-12 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Piero Gottardi Author-Name: Andreu Mas-Colell Title: A Note on the Decomposition (at a Point) of Aggregate Excess Demand on the Grassmannian Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-11 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: On the Impossibility of Implementation under Incomplete Information Creation-Date: 1999 Revision-Date: 1999 Number: 99-10 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp99/pdfs/99-10.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Author-Name: Devashish Mitra Title: A Theory of Unilateralism and Reciprocity in Trade Policy Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-9 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-9 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://volij.co.il Title: Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Duel Theory of Choice Under Risk Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-8 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-8 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Rachel M. Friedberg Title: Does University Students' Choice of Field Study Respond to High-Skilled migration? Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-7 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-7 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Title: European Union: Convergence, Balanced Growth and the Steady State Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-6 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-6 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: John C. Driscoll Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~jd Author-Name: Harumi Ito Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~harumi/ Title: Sticky Prices, Coordination, and Collusion Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-5 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~jd/collude.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-5 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mark M. Pitt Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/~mp/ Author-Name: Daniel L. Millimet Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~millimet/ Title: Estimation of Coherent Demand Systems with Many Binding Non-Negativity Constraints Abstract: Two econometric issues arise in the estimation of complete systems of producer or consumer demands when many non-negativity constraints are binding for a large share of observations, as frequently occurs with micro-level data. The first is computational. The econometric model is essentially an endogenous switching regimes model which requires the evaluation of multivariate probability integrals. The second is the relationship between demand theory and statistical coherency. If the indirect utility or cost function underlying the demand system does not satisfy the regularity conditions at each observation, the likelihood is incoherent in that the sum of the probabilities for all demand regimes is not unity and maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent. The solution presented is to use the Gibbs Sampling technique and data augmentation algorithm and rejection sampling, to solve both the dimensionality and coherency problem. With rejection sampling one can straightforwardly impose only the necessary conditions for coherency, coherency at each data point rather than global coherency. The method is illustrated with a series of simulated demand systems derived from the translog indirect random utility function. The results highlight the importance of imposing regularity when there are many non-consumed goods and the gains from imposing such conditions locally rather than globally. Classification-JEL: C3, C4, D0 Keywords: Coherency, Gibbs Sampling, demand systems, translog, data augmentation, Markov Chain Monte Carlo Length: 23 pages Creation-Date: 1999-03 Number: 99-4 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp99/pdfs/99-4.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 225484 bytes Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-4 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Title: The State: Agent or Proprieter Abstract: This paper addresses the following question: Does characterizing the state to be an agent of its subjects provide a useful "as if" framework for positive analysis of economic policy? Or, can we understand economic policy only by explicitly characterizing the state as proprietary, the instrument of the ruling elite? Length: 16 pages Creation-Date: 1999-03-02 Number: 99-3 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/state.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 36191 bytes Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-3 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Maria J. Luengo-Prado Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~marial/ Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://volij.co.il Title: Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-2 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~marial/public_html/pdfs/paper12.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 274000 bytes Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-2 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ronen Elul Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~ronel/ Author-Name: Narayanan Subramanian Title: Forum Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy Evidence from the PSID Creation-Date: 1999 Number: 99-1 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:99-1 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Ability Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality, and Economic Growth. Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/ Author-Name: Omer Moav Keywords: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ; ECONOMIC GROWTH Length: 48 pages Abstract: This paper develops a growth model in which the endogenous evolution of technological change and wage inequality is consistent with the observed pattern in the US and several other countries in the last two centuries. The evolution of the economy and its impact on wage inequality is based upon three central elements that appear consistent with empirical evidence. Classification-JEL: J31 ; O11 ; O33 ; O40 Creation-Date: 1998 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-14 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Value of Life, Value of Time, and Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility. Author-Name: Allan M. Feldman Length: 17 pages Abstract: This paper develops two straightforward value of life models; one is a probabilistic value of life model and the second is a determinstic value of time model. Simplifying assumptions allow both models to be solved analytically. Constant relative risk aversion utility functions are used, and both value of life and value of time are solved for a functions of the relative risk-aversion parameter. Classification-JEL: D11 ; D61 ; D60 ; D91 Creation-Date: 1998 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-13 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Scarcity, Abundance, and Appropriative Conflict. Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Keywords: RESOURCE ALLOCATION ; SOCIAL WELFARE Length: 19 pages Abstract: Both common sense and historical examples suggest that resource scarcity causes appro- priative con ict as people struggle with each other to avoid hunger and starvation. But, economic intuition, also supported by historical examples, suggests that resource abundance, by giving people more to ght over, causes appropriative con ict. This paper resolves this apparent paradox by showing that these two hypotheses are not inconsistent. By explicitly incorporating into our theory both the intensity of the urge to survive and the allocation of time and effort to leisure activities, we are able to formalize both of these hypotheses within the same model. Classification-JEL: D60 ; I30 ; I31 Creation-Date: 1998 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-12 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: In-Koo Cho Author-Name: Kevin Jewell Title: Auctions and Coalitions: Joint Bidding by Budget Constrained Buyers Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-11 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-11 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Ronel Elul Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~ronel/ Title: Collateral, Credit-History and the Financial Decelerator Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-10 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-10 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/~tl/ Title: The Incidental Parameter Problem Since 1948 Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-9 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-9 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: C. Simon Fan Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Title: Incentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Reform Creation-Date: 1998 Revision-Date: 1998-09 Number: 98-8 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/working/pdfs/china.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-8 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Author-Name: Giovanna Paladino Title: Exchange Rate Misalignments and Crises Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-7 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-7 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Title: Producers and Predators Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-6 Publication-Status: Pacific Economic Review Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-6 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Max Blouin Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Title: A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States Keywords: Information ; Bargaining ; Economic models Classification-JEL: C72 ; C78 ; D82 ; D83 Creation-Date: 1998 Revision-Date: 1998-08-10 Number: 98-5 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp98/pdfs/98-5.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-5 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Mark M. Pitt Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/~mp/ Author-Name: Shahidur R. Khandker Author-Name: Omar Haider Chowdhury Author-Name: Daniel L. Millimet Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~millimet/ Title: Credit Programs for the Poor and the Nutritional Status of Children in Rural Bangladesh Creation-Date: 1998 Revision-Date: 1998-01-16 Number: 98-4 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/wp98/pdfs/mark10.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-4 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Oded Galor Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/ Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/ Title: Population, Technology, and Growth: From the Malthusian Regime to the Demographic Transition Keywords: Fertility ; Economic growth ; Technological change Creation-Date: 1998 Revision-Date: 1998-08-19 Number: 98-1 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/galor/working/pdfs/gwaugust19.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-3 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Debraj Ray Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Title: A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures Creation-Date: 1998 Revision-Date: 1998-01 Number: 98-1 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-2 Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Charlotte Østergaard Author-Name: Bent E. Sørensen Author-Name: Oved Yosha Title: Permanent Income, Consumption, and Aggregate Constraints: Evidence from U.S. States Creation-Date: 1998 Number: 98-1 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-1 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Human Capital and Predation: A Positive Theory of Educational Policy Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: M. Kim Keywords: Human Resources Length: 26 pages Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for observed differences across countries in educational policies and in resulting interpersonal distributions of human capital. We analyse a general-equilibrium model in which, as a result of the apportionment of natural ability, nurturing, and publicly financed education, some people can be well endowed with human capital, whereas other people are poorly endowed with human capital. We assume that people can choose to be either producers or predators. An increase in a person's human capital makes predation a less attractive choice for that person. As a result, it is possible that by using some of their human capital to educate the poorly endowed people rather than to produce consumables the well endowed people can increase their own consumption. We also find that the nature of the educational policy that maximizes the consumption of the well endowed people depends on the ability of producers to enforce a collective choice of the amount of resources to be allocated to guarding against predators. Classification-JEL: I20 ; I21 Creation-Date: 1997 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:97-30 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Keywords: Game theory ; Economic models Length: 30 pages Abstract: We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While com-munication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive com-patibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in Wilson's [1978] coarse core, or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the Holmstrom-Myerson [1983] notion of incentive efficiency. While there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non-empty, our main result shows that this is not generally true. Classification-JEL: C71 ; C72 ; D51 Creation-Date: 1997 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:97-11 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Sovereign Debt and Consumption Smoothing. Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Author-Name: T. Han Length: 13 pages Abstract: This paper shows that whether or not a sovereign can borrow to smooth consump- tion depends both on how consumption smoothing is achieved, whether by contingent debt issuance or by contingent debt servicing, and on the penalty for debt repudiation. If a sovereign that repudiated its debt could not borrow again, but could continue to save and to dissave, then contingent debt issuance, without contingent debt servicing, cannot support a positive amount of uncollateralized sovereign debt. But, with this same penalty for repu- diation, contingent debt servicing supports a positive amount of uncollateralized sovereign debt. Classification-JEL: F34 ; H63 Creation-Date: 1997 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:97-6 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis. Author-Name: A. Ben-Ner Author-Name: Louis Putterman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/putterman/ Keywords: Social choice Length: 49 pages Abstract: In this essay, we argue that there is no scientific basis for the assumption that own well-being or command over resources is the exclusive and immutable concern of human individuals. The natural sciences, evolutionary biology in particular, and other social and behavioral sciences, especially evolutionary psychology, suggest that individual human beings may be genetically inclined towards concern not only with their own success in acquiring the resources necessary for thriving and reproducing, but also with the success of off-spring and other kin. Classification-JEL: B15 ; B20 Creation-Date: 1997 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:97-4 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Appropriate Technology and Growth Author-Name: David N. Weil Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/weil/ Keywords: Economic models ; Economic Growth ; Research and development Length: 21 pages Abstract: We present a model of growth and technology transfer based on the idea that technologies are specific to particular combinations of inputs. We argue that this model is more realistic that the usual specification in which an improvement in any technique for producing a given good improves all other techniques for producing that good. Classification-JEL: O4 ; O3 ; C51 Creation-Date: 1996 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-24 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Trade Liberalization, Market Discipline and Productivity Growth: New Evidence From India Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Author-Name: Devashish Mitra Note: Format 1 To be printed in landscape format Number: 96-8 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-8b.ps File-Format: application/postscript Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-8 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Customs Unions With Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Author-Name: Jagdish Bhagwati Number: 96-7 File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-7.ps File-Format: application/postscript Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-7 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: On the Choice of Instrument: Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs) vs Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-6.ps File-Format: application/postscript File-Function: Figure File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-6f1.eps File-Format: application/eps File-Function: Figure I Author-Name: Pravin Krishna Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-6 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Regionalism and Multilaterialism: A Political Economy Approach Author-Name: Pravin Krishna File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-5.ps File-Format: application/postscript File-Function: main text File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-5f1.eps File-Format: application/eps File-Function: Figure I File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-5f2.eps File-Format: application/eps File-Function: Figure II Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-5 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: The Value of Life Revisited Author-Name: Allan M. Feldman File-URL: http://www.econ.brown.edu/workingp/1996/96-2.ps File-Format: application/postscript Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:96-2 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: The Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate of Germany. Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Author-Name: K. Sauernheimer Keywords: EXCHANGE RATE;ECONOMIC MODELS Length: 34 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-16 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: American Fiscal Policy in the 1990's Author-Name: Herschel I. Grossman Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/grossman/ Length: 10 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-15 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods Author-Name: Nir Dagan Author-Homepage: http://www.nirdagan.com Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Author-Name: Oscar Volij Author-Homepage: http://volij.co.il Keywords: Tax policy Length: 23 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-14 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Channels of Interstate Risksharing : US 1963-1990 Author-Name: P. Asdrubali Author-Name: Bent E. Sørensen Author-Name: Oved Yosha Keywords: Risk; Capital markets Length: 27 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-13 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Growth Under Uncertainty with Experimentation Author-Name: G. Berttocchi Keywords: Information; Investments Length: 19 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-12 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: The Bargaining Set and Coalition Formation. Author-Name: K.I. Shimomura Keywords: Game theory Length: 26 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-11 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Reversibility Does Not Convert The Equilibrium Exstence Theorem. Author-Name: K.I. Shimomura Keywords: Economic equilibrium; Economic models Length: 12 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-10 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Negociations with Side-Deals Author-Name: S. Baliga Author-Name: Roberto Serrano Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/ Keywords: NEGOCIANTS; INFORMATION Length: 20 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-9 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: The Fundamental Determinants of the real Exchange Rate of the US Dollar Relative to the G7 Author-Name: Jerome L. Stein Keywords: Financial policy Length: 37 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-8 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Nonparametric Bootstrap Analysis with Applications to Engel Demand Curves Author-Name: Pedro L. Gozalo Keywords: REGRESSION ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS Length: 33 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-7 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Coalitional Non-Cooperative Approaches to Cooperation. Author-Name: Rajiv Vohra Author-Homepage: http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/ Keywords: GAME THEORY Length: 15 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-6 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth. Author-Name: Rachel M. Friedberg Author-Name: J. Hunt Keywords: IMMIGRATION; LABOUR MARKET Length: 36 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-5 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: A Structural Model of Multiple Welfare Program Participation and Labor Supply Author-Name: M. Keane Author-Name: R. Mofitt Keywords: TAX POLICY; SOCIAL WELFARE; INCOME Length: 40 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-4 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Title: Exact Structural Inference in Optimal Job Search Models Author-Name: Tony Lancaster Author-Homepage: http://pstc3.pstc.brown.edu/~tl/ Keywords: EMPLOYMENT; ECONOMIC MODELS Length: 35 pages Creation-Date: 1995 Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:95-3