Curriculum Vitae
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Working Papers
Egalitarianism in Mechanism Design (Revised January 2012)
Mechanism design tells us what is feasible under asymmetric information, but which mechanism to select among all those that are incentive compatible? This paper examines ways to extend egalitarian notions of fairness to mechanism design.
Implementation and Bounded Rationality (Revised December 2011)
What outcomes can a mechanism designer implement if he knows that individuals are subject to specific choice biases, or cannot exclude that they might suffer from such biases?
On the Selection of Abitrators, joint with Kfir Eliaz and Brian Knight (October 2011)
Do current selection procedures from arbitration agencies fulfill their and their participants' goals? We use theoretical, empirical and experimental arguments to show that current selection procedures can be outperformed by alternative mechanisms.
Premise-Based vs. Outcome-Based Information Aggregation, joint with Kfir Eliaz (August 2011)
In the spirit of the doctrinal paradox, suppose that a defendant is guilty if and only if two pieces of evidence hold. Allowing for strategic behavior in an information aggregation game a la Condorcet, what is more efficient, to vote directly on the outcome (guilty or not guilty) or to vote on each premise and draw the logical inference?
On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining, with Kfir Eliaz (March 2011)
Studies bargainers' incentives to withhold or delay the disclosure of win-win alternatives, and finds the bargaining solution that minimizes such inefficiency.
On the Redundancy of the Implicit Welfarist Axiom in Bargaining Theory (Revised February 2011)
Shows how one can recover Nash's classical axiomatic result while reasoning on economic outcomes instead of Bernoulli utilities.
Destroy to Save, with Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald, and Nicholas Jenning
On the allocation of multiple units of a same good to inviduals with unit demands and quasi-linear utilities. A worst-case scenario analysis over strategy-proof mechanisms shows that it might be optimal in some cases to destroy a few units of the good, thereby highlighting the necessity to consider non-VCG mechanisms. Numerical methods are developed to identify better mechanisms.
A Comment on ``The Veil of Public Ignorance''
Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin, with Roberto Serrano
Publications
(in anti-chronological order)
Reason-Based Choice: a Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects, with Kfir Eliaz, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming. (online appendix)
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information, with David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
No Profitable Decompositions in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems, with Camelia Bejan, Journal of Economic Theory, 2011.
Cores of Combined Games, with Francis Bloch, Journal of Economic Theory, 2010.
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value, with Roberto Serrano, Econometrica, 2008.
Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information, Economics Letters, 2008.
Impartial Division of a Dollar, with Herve Moulin and Nicolaus Tideman, Journal of Economic Theory, 2008.
An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008.
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution, Social Choice and Welfare, 2007.
The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Economic Theory, 2007.
The Procedural Value for Cooperative Games with Non-Transferable Utility, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007.
Values for Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: an Eloquent Example, Games and Economic Behavior, 2005.
Two Remarks on the Inner Core, with Enrico Minelli, Games and Economic Behavior, 2005.
Axiomatizing the Harsanyi Solution, the Symmetric Egalitarian Solution and the Consistent Solution for NTU-Games, with Hans Peters and Horst Zank, International Journal of Game Theory, 2004.
Two-Person Bargaining with Verifiable Types, with Enrico Minelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2004.
Teaching
Distributive Justice (undergrad, Rice U, fall 05 and 06)
Game Theory and Applications to Economics (undergrad, Brown U, fall 04, 07, 08, 09, and spring 12)
Intermediate Microeconomics (undergrad, Rice U, fall 06, and Brown U, fall 08, 09, and spring 12)
Microeconomic III (grad, Rice U, fall 05 and 06)
Risk, Uncertainty and Information (grad, Brown U, fall 07)