Classes: MW 1-2:20 pm at Robinson Hall 301.
Office hours: W 2:30-4pm at Robinson Hall 302B.
Contents: In the first part of this class we will review the basic equilibrium concepts for situations of strategic interaction, explore their applications and study their performance in explaining actual behavior. In the second part we will focus on the theory of dynamic games, specially repeated games and reputation. Depending on time and demand we may also cover the basics of evolutionary game theory.
Grading: Grades will depend on homeworks (15%), an essay (15%), a paper (15%) and two exams (55%).
For Part I choose the book you like the most:
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. Game Theory. (FT)
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R. Microeconomic Theory. (MWG)
Myerson, R.B. Game Theory: analysis of conflict. (M)
Osborne, M.J. and Rubinstein, A. A Course in Game Theory. (OR)
For Part II:
Mailath, G. and Samuelson, L. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. (MS)
For review of experimental economics:
Kagel, J.H. and A. Roth (1995). The Handbook of Experimental Economics (KR)
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: experiments in strategic interaction (C)
For Part III :
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D.K. The Theory of Learning in Games. (FL)
Weibull, J.W. Evolutionary Game Theory. (W)
Part I: Basic equilibrium and solution concepts
1. For static games of complete information
1.1 Nash Equilibrium
MWG 8.A and 8.D
OR 2.1-2.3, 3.1 and 3.2
Nash, J. "Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Jan. 15, 1950), pp. 48-49.
Myerson, R. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory", Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1999.
Application: Oligopoly games
Cournot, A. 1838. Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses. Chapter VII.
Empirics: Palacios-Huerta, I. "Professionals Play Minimax", Review of Economic Studies, April 2003, vol. 70, no. 2, pp. 395-415.
Nagel, R., Bosch-Domench, A., Satorra, A. and García-Montalvo, J. "One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments," American Economic Review, December 2002, Vol 92 No.5, pp 1687-1701.
1.2 Dominated strategies and rationalizability
M 2.5 and 3.1
Bernheim, D. (1984). "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica 52(4).
1.3 Trembling-hand perfection, risk dominance, correlated equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium
FT 2.2 and 8.4.1
OR 3.3 and 12.5.1
McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1995. “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 6-38.
Russell W. Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross. 1992. "Communication in coordination games," Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1.4 Introduction ot experimental economics
Harrison, G. and J.A. List (2004). "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature 42.
2. For dynamic games of complete information
2.1 Definition of game and strategies
M 2.1, 2.2 and 4.1
OR 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.3 and 6.4
2.2 Nash equilibrium, backward induction and subgame perfection
M 4.2, 4.6 and 4.7
OR 6.1.3 and 6.2
2.3 Forward Induction
2.4. Psychological Games
John Genakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1989). "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior 1.
Application 1: Repeated oligopoly (introduction to infinitely repeated games).
Application 2: Rubinstein Bargaining model.
MWG 9 appendix A
Empirics: Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M. and Zamir, S. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study". American Economic Review 81(5), 1991.
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1992). "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica 60(4).
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta and Oscar Volij (2009). "Field Centipedes," American Economic Review 99(4).
Homework 1 Answer Key
3. For static games of incomplete information: Bayesian games and Bayesian
Application 1: Auctions
Vickrey, W., (1961), "Counterespeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders." Journal of Finance, 16.
Riley, J.G. and Samuelson, W.F., (1982) "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, 71.
Empirics 1: Auctions
Application 2: Voting in committees
Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer, “Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting,” American Political Science Review, 1998, pp. 23–35.
Guarnaschelli, S., R.D. McKelvey, and T.R. Palfrey, “An experimental study of jury decision rules,” American Political Science Review, 2000, pp. 407–423.
Emanuel Vespa and Ignacio Esponda, mimeo, Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction: Pivotal Voting in the Laboratory
4. For dynamic games of incomplete information: Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibrium
M 4.3 and 4.4
OR 11 and 12
Application 1: Information cascades
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, 100(5).
Lisa R. Anderson; Charles A. Holt (1997). "Information Cascades in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, 87(5).
Homework 2 Answer Key
Midterm (March 14)
Essay (Due April 2) Answer Key
Part II: More on Dynamic Games
5. Infinitely Repeated Games
5.1 Games with perfect information
5.1.1 Folk theorem (and some on characterization)
Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E.(1986). "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 54(3). Class Notes
Application: Repeated games and Macroeconomics
Rotemberg, J.J. and Saloner, G. (1986). "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms," American Economic Review, 76. Class Notes
Empirics: Dal Bó, P. (2005). "Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games," American Economic Review 95. Class Notes
van Damme, E. (1989). "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 47.
5.1.3 Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
Fudenberg, D., Kreps D.M. and Maskin, E. (1990). "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, 57.
5.2 Repeated games with imperfect information
5.2.1 Perfect public equilibria
Green, E.J. and Porter, R.H. (1984). "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Competition," Econometrica, 52.
Abreu, D., Pearce, D. and Stachetti, E. (1990). "Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Econometrica, 58.
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. and Maskin, E. (1994). "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Information", Econometrica, 62(5).
Empirics: M. Aoyagi and G. Frechette (2009). "Collusion as Public Monitoring Becomes Noisy: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Economic Theory 144(3).
5.2.2 Private monitoring and private strategies
Kandori, M. (2002) "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, 102.
Ely, J. and J. Valimaki (2002) "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory 102..
Kandori, M. and Obara, I. (2000) "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: the Role of Private Strategies," mimeo.
MS 10, 12
5.3 Repeated games with changing partners
Kandori, M. (1992). "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, 59(1).
Application: Repeated Games and Economic History
Greif, A. (1993)."Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade- the Maghribi traders coalition", American Economic Review, 83.
John Duffy and Jack Ochs. 2009. "Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction" Games and Economic Behavior 66(2).
Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari. 2009. "Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future" American Economic Review 99(3).
Homework 3 Answer Key
6.1 Games with one long-run player
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982). "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 50.
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D.K. (1989) "Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player," Econometrica, 57.
Ely, J and J. Valimaki (2003) "Bad Reputation", Quarterly Journal of Economics 118.
6.2 Games with two long-run players
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and B. Wilson (1982). "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, 27.
Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E. (1986) "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 54(3).
Empirics: Andreoni, J. and Miller, J.H. (1993). "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, 103.
Paper (draft April 16)
Paper (short presentation April 23 and 25)
3.1. Evolutionary stable strategies and replicator dynamics
W 2 and 3
3.2 Evolution with persistent randomness
Young, P. and Foster, D. (1991). "Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run," Games and Economic Behavior, 3.
Young, P. (1993). "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, 61.
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. and Rob, R. (1993). "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, 61.
Ellison, G. (1993). "Learning, Local interaction and Coordination," Econometrica, 61.
Johnson, P., Levine, D.K. and Pesendorfer, W. (2001). "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Journal of Economic Theory, 100
Homework 4 Answer Key
Final: 05\12\2012 2PM