- Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games, American Economic Review, December 2005. (data and code)
- Plata o Plomo?: Bribes and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, American Political Science Review, February 2006.
- Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality, Economic Theory, January 2007.
- Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations, RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2007.
- Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy, Fall 2007.
- Political Dynasties with Ernesto
Dal Bó and Jason Snyder, Review of Economic Studies, January 2009. (data and code)
- Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships with Anna Aizer, Journal of Public Economics, April 2009.
- Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman, American Economic Review, December 2010. (online appendix) (data and code)
- The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence with Guillaume Fréchette, American Economic Review, February 2011. (online appendix) (data and code)
- Workers, Warriors and
Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium with Ernesto
Dal Bó, Journal of the European Economic Association, August 2011.
- In “Do the Right Thing:” The Effects of Moral Suasion on Cooperation with Ernesto Dal Bó, we study experimentally whether and how moral appeals can help sustain cooperation. Moral appeals cause a transitory increase in cooperation in basic public good games, but in the presence of punishment instruments moral appeals have persistent effects. We find that moral suasion works both through expectation and preference-shifting effects.
- In Strategy Choice In The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Guillaume Fréchette, we use a novel experimental design to identify the strategies used by subjects in
an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design
strategies that will play in their place. The strategies chosen
by the subjects include some commonly mentioned strategies, such as
tit-for-tat and Grim trigger.
- In The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation with Enrique Pujals, we study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. We show that there are strategies with a
uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population and
that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate.
To participate in experiments go to BUSSEL