Recent Publications:

• Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games, American Economic Review, December 2005. (data and code)
  
• Plata o Plomo?: Bribes and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, American Political Science Review, February 2006.
  
• Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality, Economic Theory, January 2007.
  
• Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations, RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2007.
  
• Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Fall 2007.
• Political Dynasties with Ernesto Dal Bó and Jason Snyder, Review of Economic Studies, January 2009. (data and code)
• Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships with Anna Aizer, Journal of Public Economics, April 2009.
• Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium with Ernesto Dal Bó, forthcoming Journal of the European Economic Association.
• Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman, American Economic Review, December 2010. (online appendix) (data and code)
• The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence with Guillaume Fréchette, American Economic Review, February 2011. (online appendix) (data and code)
• Conflict and Policy in General Equilibrium: Insights from a Standard Trade Model with Ernesto Dal Bó, forthcoming in the The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.

Working Papers:

• In “Do the Right Thing:” The Effects of Moral Suasion on Cooperation with Ernesto Dal Bó, we study experimentally whether and how moral appeals can help sustain cooperation. Moral appeals cause a transitory increase in cooperation in basic public good games, but in the presence of punishment instruments moral appeals have persistent effects. We find that moral suasion works both through expectation and preference-shifting effects.
  
  
• In Strategy Choice In The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Guillaume Fréchette, we use a novel experimental design to identify the strategies used by subjects in an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiment. We ask subjects to design strategies that will play in their place. The strategies chosen by the subjects include some commonly mentioned strategies, such as tit-for-tat and Grim trigger.
  

To participate in experiments go to BUSSEL