Pedro Dal Bó Pedro Dal Bo;

In "Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships" with Anna Aizer, we present evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences: they demand commitment devices. We find that "no-drop" policies -- which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges -- result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered.

In "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy" with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman, we show that the treatment effect of policies may depend on whether they are endogenous or exogenous to the society on which they are imposed. Democratic institutions may have an effect on behavior in addition to the effect in terms of policy choice. More generally, our findings have implications for empirical studies of treatment effects in other contexts: the effect of a treatment may depend on whether it is endogenous or exogenous.

In "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence" with Guillaume Fréchette, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games. We find that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which it happens are more stringent than the sub-game perfect conditions usually considered.

In “Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium ” with Ernesto Dal Bó, we study social conflict in its connection to the appropriation of resources. We show that not every wealth-increasing shock (or policy) will reduce conflict. What’s critical is the factor intensity of the industry initially affected. The model can explain empirical patterns of crime and civil war, and account for various populist policies including inefficient redistribution.