Research Statement

Recent Publications:

• Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games, American Economic Review, December 2005. (data and code)
  
• Plata o Plomo?: Bribes and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, American Political Science Review, February 2006.
  
• Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality, Economic Theory, January 2007.
  
• Tacit Collusion under Interest Rate Fluctuations, RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2007.
  
• Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available with Ernesto Dal Bó and Rafael Di Tella, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Fall 2007.
• Political Dynasties with Ernesto Dal Bó and Jason Snyder, Review of Economic Studies, January 2009. (data and code)
• "Love, Hate and Murder: Commitment Devices in Violent Relationships" with Anna Aizer, Journal of Public Economics, April 2009.
• “Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium ” with Ernesto Dal Bó, forthcoming Journal of the European Economic Association.
• "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy" with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman, forthcoming American Economic Review.
  
  

Working Papers:

• In "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence" (accepted subject to revisions American Economic Review) with Guillaume Fréchette, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games. We find that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which it happens are more stringent than the sub-game perfect conditions usually considered. (online appendix)
  
  
• In “Do the Right Thing:” The Effects of Moral Suasion on Cooperation with Ernesto Dal Bó, we study experimentally whether and how moral appeals can help sustain cooperation. Moral appeals cause a transitory increase in cooperation in basic public good games, but in the presence of punishment instruments moral appeals have persistent effects. We find that moral suasion works both through expectation and preference-shifting effects.

Work in Progress:

• "Strategies Used in Infinitely Repeated Games," with Guillaume Féchette.


• "Political Dynasties: the value of last names?," with Ernesto Dal Bó and Jason Snyder.


• "Understanding the Direct Effect of Democracy," with Andrew Foster and Louis Putterman.


• "Equilibrium Selection in Infinitely Repeated Games," with Enrique Pujals.
  
  
  
  To participate in experiments go to BUSSEL