Roberto Serrano
Harrison S. Kravis University Professor of Economics, Brown University
Research Associate, Instituto Madrileņo de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) 		Brown Shield
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This material has been published in Games and Economic Behavior  39, 292-308 (2002), the only definitive repository of the content that has been certified and accepted after peer review. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by Copyright © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. This material may not be copied or reposted without explicit permission. (Copyright © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V.). For Elsevier online journals, see http://www.sciencedirect.com

 

Bargaining and Bargaining Sets

 

Games and Economic Behavior 39 (2002), 292-308

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 Abstract
We argue that, in exchange economies, various versions of the bargaining set cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We then propose an extensive form mechanism that exactly implements the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism corresponds closely to the description of the bargaining set and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D51.
Key Words: bargaining set; implementation; approximate implementation; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium

 

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