Articles in refereed journals and reference books:
- A. Kar, I. Ray and R. Serrano, "A Difficulty in Implementing Correlated Equilibrium Distributions,"
Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
- R. Serrano,
“On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation,”
Economics Bulletin 29, No. 3, (2009), 2357-2367.
- R. Serrano, "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," in
Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, R. Meyers (ed.), Springer, New York, (2009).
- A.M. Feldman and R. Serrano, "Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions," Harvard College Mathematics Review 2, No. 2 (2008), 46-57.
- R. J. Aumann and R. Serrano, "An Economic Index of Riskiness," Journal of Political Economy 116, No. 5, (2008), 810-836.
- G. de Clippel and R. Serrano, "Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value," Econometrica 76, (2008), 1413-1436.
- R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability
of Edgeworth’s Recontracting," Economic Journal 118, (2008), 1719-1741.
- Kandori, M., R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Decentralized Trade, Random Utility
and the Evolution of Social
Welfare," Journal of Economic Theory 140, (2008), 328-338.
- R. Serrano, "Bargaining," in
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2nd edition),
S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), McMillan, London (2008).
- R. Serrano, "Nash Program," in
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (2nd edition),
S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.), McMillan, London (2008).
- R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting
Games," Journal of Economic Theory 134, (2007), 117-137.
- R. Serrano and K.-I. Shimomura, "A Comparison of the Average Prekernel
and the Prekernel," Mathematical Social Sciences 52, (2006), 288-301.
- I. Palacios-Huerta and R. Serrano,
"Rejecting Small Gambles under
Expected Utility,"
Economics Letters 91, (2006), 250-259.
- P. Gottardi and R. Serrano, "Market Power and Information Revelation
in Dynamic Trading," Journal of the European Economic Association 3, (2005), 1279-1317.
- R. Serrano, "Fifty Years of the Nash Program,
1953-2003,"
Investigaciones Economicas 29, (2005), 219-258.
- R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "A
Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation", Games and
Economic Behavior 50, (2005), 312-331.
- R. Serrano, "The Measurement of
Intellectual Influence: the Views of a Sceptic", Economics Bulletin,
1, No. 3, (2004), 1-6.
- R. Serrano, "The Theory of
Implementation of Social Choice Rules", SIAM Review 46, (2004), 377-414.
- T. Kunimoto and R. Serrano, "Bargaining
and Competition Revisited," Journal of Economic Theory 115,
(2004), 78-88.
- A. Ben-Shoham, R. Serrano and O. Volij,"The
Evolution of Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 114,
(2004), 310-328.
- Y. In and R. Serrano, "Agenda
Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 53, (2004), 385-399.
- Y. In and R. Serrano, "Agenda
Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas,"
Economics Letters, 79 (2003), 325-331.
- R. Serrano "Decentralized
Information and the Walrasian Outcome: a Pairwise Meetings Market with Private
Values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38,
(2002), 65-89.
- R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Implementing
the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set ," Investigaciones Economicas,
26, (2002), 285-298.
- R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "
Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior,
39, (2002), 292-308.
- R. Serrano, R. Vohra and O. Volij, "On
the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information,,"
Econometrica, 69 (2001),1685-1696.
- M. R. Blouin and R. Serrano, "A
Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States,"
Review of Economic Studies, 68, (2001), 323-346.
- R. Serrano and R. Vohra, "Some
Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica,
69, (2001), 785-792.
- S. Baliga and R. Serrano, "Multilateral
Negotiations with Private Side-Deals: a Multiplicity Example,"
Economics Bulletin, 3, No. 1, (2001), 1-7
- R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Walrasian
Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior," Journal of Economic
Theory, 95, (2000), 79-106
- N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Bargaining,
Coalitions and Competition," Economic Theory 15,
(2000), 279-296
- N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O.Volij, "Feasible
Implementation of Taxation Methods," Review of Economic Design
4, (1999), 57-72.
- R. Serrano and K.-I. Shimomura, "Beyond
Nash Bargaining Theory: the Nash Set," Journal of Economic
Theory 83,(1998), 286-307.
- N. Dagan, R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Comment
on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative
Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'",Econometrica 66,(1998),
1231-1233.
- R. Serrano and O. Volij, "Axiomatizations
of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies," Journal of Mathematical
Economics 30,(1998), 87-108.
- R. Serrano and I. Zapater, "The
Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete," Games and Economic
Behavior 22, (1998), 343-363.
- N. Dagan and R. Serrano, "Invariance
and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economics
Letters 58,(1998), 43-49.
- R.Serrano, "Reinterpreting
the Kernel," Journal of Economic Theory 77,(1997),
58-80.
- R. Serrano and R.Vohra, "Non-Cooperative
Implementation of the Core," Social Choice and Welfare
14, (1997), 513-525.
- R. Serrano,"A Comment
on the Nash Program and the Theory of Implementation," Economics
Letters 55,(1997), 203-208.
- N. Dagan,R. Serrano and O. Volij, "A
Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games
and Economic Behavior 18,(1997), 55-72.
- R. Serrano and O. Yosha, "Welfare
Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information,"
Economic Theory 8,(1996),167-175.
- V. Krishna and R. Serrano, "Multilateral
Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies 63,(1996),
61-80.
- S. Baliga and R. Serrano, "Multilateral
Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic
Theory 67, (1995), 578-589.
- R. Serrano,"A Market
to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory 67,
(1995), 285-294.
- R. Serrano and O. Yosha,"Decentralized
Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Recent Developments," Journal
of International and Comparative Economics 4, (1995), 223-241.
- V. Krishna and R. Serrano, "Perfect
Equilibria of a Model of n-Person NonCooperative Bargaining," International
Journal of Game Theory 24, (1995), 259-272.
- R. Serrano, "Strategic
Bargaining, Surplus Sharing Problems and the Nucleolus," Journal
of Mathematical Economics 24, (1995), 319-329.
- R. Serrano, "Non-Cooperative
Implementation of the Nucleolus: the 3-Player Case," International
Journal of Game Theory 22, (1993), 345-357.
- R. Serrano and O. Yosha, "Information
Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: the One-Sided Information
Case," Economic Theory 3 , (1993), 481-499.
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