Rajiv Vohra
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Working Papers
Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting
Games, Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2005-01, Department
of Economics, Brown University.
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Incomplete Information, Credibility and the
Core, Bhaskar Dutta and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2003-21, Department
of Economics, Brown University. (Revised: March 2005)
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A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation,
Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2002-11, Department of Economics,
Brown University. (Revised: January 2004).
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Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set,
Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2001-24, Department of Economics,
Brown University.
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The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the
absence of wealth effects, Françoise Forges,
Jean-François Mertens and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2001-01, Department
of Economics, Brown University.
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Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy:
A Survey, Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli and
Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 2000-22, Department of Economics, Brown University.
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Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation,
Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra, Working Paper No. 00-16, Department of Economics,
Brown University.
This has been replaced by Working
Paper No. 2002-11.
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