Rajiv Vohra
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Recent Papers
Coalition Formation, with Debraj Ray, (2013).
Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation, with Roberto Serrano, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 775-785 (2010).
Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games, with Roberto Serrano, Journal of Economic Theory, 134, 117-137 (2007).
A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation, with Roberto Serrano, Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 312-332 (2005).
Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core, with Bhaskar Dutta, Mathematical Social Sciences, 50, 148-165 (2005).
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects, with Françoise Forges and Jean-François Mertens, Econometrica, 70, 1865-1892 (2002).
Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey, with Françoise Forges and Enrico Minelli, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 1-41 (2002).
Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, with Roberto Serrano, Investigaciones Economicas, 26, 285-298 (2002).
Bargaining and Bargaining Sets, with Roberto Serrano, Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 292-308 (2002).
A Simple Model of Coalitional Bidding, with In-Koo Cho and Kevin Jewell, Economic Theory, 19, 435-457 (2002).
Coalitional Power and Public Goods, with Debraj Ray, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 1355-1384 (2001). For proofs of two assertions in the paper click here.
On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information, with Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij, Econometrica, 69, 1685-1696 (2001).